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Abstract
Nervous systems process information. This platitude contains an in-
teresting ambiguity between multiple senses of the term “information.”
According to a popular thought, the ambiguity is best resolved by reserv-
ing semantic concepts of information for the explication of neural activity
at a high level of organization, and quantitative concepts of information
for the explication of neural activity at a low level of organization. This
article articulates the justification behind this view, and concludes that it
is an oversimplification. An analysis of the meaning of claims about Shan-
non information rates in the spiking activity of neurons is then developed.
On the basis of that analysis, it is shown that quantitative conceptions
of information are more intertwined with semantic concepts than they
seem to be, and, partially for that reason, are also more philosophically
interesting.
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1 Introduction
If anything deserves to be called an information processing device, the brain
does. Sophisticated behavior requires a device that can track and process an
enormous amount of data. How does the brain manage it? The neuron doctrine,
first established on the basis of anatomical evidence in 1905 by Ramo´n y Cajal,
says that individual neurons are the brain’s fundamental functional units, and
that they play this role by sending chemical and electrical signals to one another.
Neurons, it seems reasonable to infer, must themselves be simple information
processing devices. This idea is old, and has played a fundamental role in the
development of neuroscience. McCulloch and Pitts began referring to it as a
law of neural science back in 1943 (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943).
Despite this, it is not easy to find a straight answer to the question: what
kind of information do neurons process? Philosophers have suggested that, at
the most coarse-grained level of analysis, there are just two kinds: Shannon
information, and semantic information (Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2008; Pic-
cinini and Scarantino, 2011). A physical signal conveys semantic information
if it conveys an instruction or reports a fact. Human language provides the
most obvious examples of semantic information transmission, but semantic in-
formation can also be transmitted without the use of language. For example,
a stop sign and a red traffic light convey the same instruction, but only one
of them uses language to get the message across. Shannon information, which
derives from an area of applied mathematics called information theory, has less
to do with the meanings of signs, and more to do with the frequency with which
different signal types appear.
When cognitive psychologists talk about information processing operations
in the brain, they are typically talking about a version of semantic information.
Cognitive psychologists are typically interested in understanding how purpose-
ful behavior gets generated by the mental representations of the world that
are stored in our heads. Mental representations can transmit both varieties
of semantic information mentioned above. Perceptual representations function
like reports about the nature of the perceived environment, while motor rep-
resentations function like instructions to behave this way or that. However,
when we descend to the level of a single neuron, and attempt to describe the
spiking behavior observed at that level, semantic concepts no longer have any
clear application. Neuroscientists who study the properties of individual spike
trains tend to talk readily about Shannon information, but not about particular
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instructions or commands that action potentials are meant to convey.
So, at least at first glance, the best answer to the question “what kind of
information is brain information?” seems to have two parts. At a high level
of neural organization, brain information is semantic, but down at the level
of single neurons, semantic properties are irrelevant, and the only information
to speak of is Shannon information. My aim in this article is to flesh out
this bifurcated view of how informational concepts apply to the brain and ask
whether it is justified. The upshot of the discussion is that the bifurcation
is somewhat less clear than our first glance suggests, and that claims about
Shannon information at the single neuron level are not entirely independent
from concerns about semantic properties.
2 Why Action Potentials Do Not Transmit Se-
mantic Information
In order to assess the bifurcation view of brain information, we need to un-
derstand the philosophical rationale behind the application of semantic terms.
Ordinary language philosophers, inspired by Ryle and Wittgenstein, were the
first to make the articulation of this rationale a core feature of philosophical
theory. On their view, semantic properties emerge only in contexts in which
human agency is at work. They argued that terms like “perceive,” “think,” and
“process information” can only be sensibly applied to rational agents. For them,
to apply these terms to small neural structures within the brain is to make a
kind of category mistake called the “mereological fallacy” (Bennett and Hacker,
2003). Their reasoning can be summarized with the following argument: (i)
agential language can only be applied to persons; (ii) to say that a thing pro-
cesses information is to describe it in agential language; (iii) neurons are not
persons; (iv) neurons, therefore, cannot be described as information processing
devices.
Today, most philosophers of mind and language are usually happy to reject
premise (i), and are, accordingly, willing to countenance semantic phenomena
in systems far simpler than fully rational human persons. Nevertheless, at least
within naturalistic philosophy, a kernel of the ordinary language view has been
retained. It can be expressed as a necessary condition on the realization of se-
mantic properties. A physical signal has semantic properties only where there
is an interest-driven justification for the response it engenders. This principle
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is one of the core ideas behind recent work on the evolution of meaning and
communication.1 Since human persons clearly have interests, and since they
typically respond to perceptual information by behaving in ways that further
their interests, their perceptual and cognitive states can, according to this prin-
ciple, justifiably be described as signals that transmit semantic information.
More interestingly, this principle also justifies the use of semantic description in
very simple organisms. Consider quorum sensing. Some bacteria will emit a sig-
naling molecule once they detect that the density of conspecifics has surpassed
some threshold. If the signal is successfully received by neighboring bacteria,
it can trigger interesting collective behaviors such as the formation of a biofilm
(Rutherford and Bassler, 2012). In this example, the relevant sense of “inter-
est” is evolutionary rather than rational. The formation of the biofilm is in the
interest of the initial bacterium because it is adaptive. It might, for example,
allow the bacterial colony to remain attached to a surface where it is likely to
get continued access to nutrients.
We now have an initial understanding of a naturalistic philosophical rationale
behind the description of behavior in semantic terms. Given this rationale,
we can ask: do spike trains carry semantic information? Surprisingly, and
despite the fact that neurons clearly participate in the generation of semantic
phenomena, there are at least two good reasons to think that they do not
themselves exhibit semantic properties. The first reason is that, unlike bacteria,
neurons do not have interests in the standard evolutionary sense. Most neurons
do not undergo mitosis, and therefore cannot form anything like cell lineages
within the lifetime of an individual organism. Because they do not form lineages,
they are not subject to natural selection. As a result, the notion of “evolutionary
interests” does not apply to neurons in the relatively clear way that it does apply
to bacteria. If neurons do have interests, it is only in an extremely attenuated
sense, the usefulness of which is controversial.2
There is, in any case, a more fundamental reason to think that spike trains
do not carry semantic information: they do not have the right kind of causal
connection to the environment. To see this, consider the strategy for attributing
semantic content that Daniel Dennett calls “the intentional stance” (Dennett,
1989). In order to predict the behavior of an organism, you treat it as a rational
agent. Given your knowledge of the organism’s goals and the environment in
1Versions of this idea are supported, for example, in Skyrms (2010), Harms (2006), Godfrey-
Smith and Mart´ınez (2013), and Calcott (2017).
2For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter 8 of Dennett (2017).
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which it is embedded, you formulate a hypothesis about which mental content
it would make sense for it to have. The attribution of content is justified to the
extent that it allows you to make more efficient and/or more accurate predictions
about the behavior of the organism.3
The intentional stance will typically provide little justification the ascription
of semantic content to a spike train because, when we observe the spike train
of a single neuron, it is typically far from clear exactly which behavioral goal it
is meant to realize. This is because, as Rosa Cao has eloquently demonstrated
(Cao, 2012), whole organism behaviors are typically generated by a symphony
of neural activity to which any given neuron makes only a small contribution.
Most individual spike trains do not reliably cause whole-organism behaviors
that can be interpreted as furthering the interests of the organism, and therefore
cannot be reasonably viewed as sending signals with a particular meaning that
is derived from its association with that behavior.
In his new book, which includes a lengthy discussion of the distinction be-
tween Shannon information and semantic information, Dennett seems to share
Cao’s view. Although the intentional stance might be applicable to some extent
at the coarse-grained level of functional neuroanatomy, such as in the discovery
that the fusiform face area has the function of processing perceptual information
about faces, it seems inapplicable, given the current state of knowledge, to “the
incredibly convoluted details of individual neuron connectivity and activity”
(Dennett, 2017, p. 111).
So we seem to have a clear rationale for attributing semantic properties to
whole organisms, but no corresponding rationale for attributing semantic prop-
erties to the behaviors of individual neurons. When viewed as an isolated fact,
this is not surprising. After all, we attribute all sorts of interesting properties
to whole organisms that we do not attribute to their parts. But the situation
does become puzzling when we reflect on the widespread use of informational
terminology at the single neuron level. Open any introductory neuroscience
textbook and you are bound to find some version of the the claim that neurons
send information to one another. Moreover, in the first paragraph of this essay,
I gave a casual argument in support of the claim that neurons are information
processing devices. However, if we have no rationale for the ascription of se-
mantic properties to trains of action potentials, then either that argument is
3Notice that this strategy entails, but is not entailed by, the necessary condition for the at-
tribution of semantic properties mentioned above. This places Dennett’s approach to semantic
information within the naturalistic tradition.
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flawed, or it appeals to a sense of the word “information” that is distinct from
the more common, semantic sense.
One of the reasons that the concept of Shannon information seems useful
is that it supplies this distinct sense of the term “information.” Shannon in-
formation is austere and mathematical. It depends on nothing other than the
probabilities associated with spike trains, and those probabilities can be esti-
mated by means of direct empirical measurement. And empirical measurement,
one hopes, does not require the application of controversial principles from the
philosophy of mind! As Shannon and Weaver claimed in the opening of their
landmark book on information theory, “These semantic aspects of communi-
cation are irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949,
p. 2). But if Shannon information has nothing at all to do with semantic infor-
mation - if it is just a scientifically neutral mathematical concept - why bother
describing spike trains as informational in the first place? Is it just a linguis-
tic accident that we use the term “information” to describe these two sets of
properties? I think the relationship between semantic information and Shannon
information is more subtle than that. To see why, I will now introduce some
basic ideas from information theory, and then briefly describe how they are used
in the study of spike trains.
3 Information Theory and Its Use in Neuro-
science
The central quantity in information theory is called entropy. Entropy is a mea-
sure of how much information is associated with a single message. How to
capture that idea quantitatively? Intuitively, the amount of information in a
communication system is related to its capacity to reduce uncertainty. If a
message is highly probable, then one can be fairly certain that it will be ex-
pressed. If improbable, one has very little certainty that it will be expressed.
This suggests that the entropy of a message should be inversely proportional to
its probability. Another natural requirement is that the amount of information
in a sequence of two messages should be the sum of the information provided
by each individual message. Probabilities combine multiplicatively (the prob-
ability of two heads in a row is (1/2)(1/2)). Additivity is imposed by taking
the logarithm. So, the expression for the entropy of an individual message x is
the logarithm of the inverse of its probability, or log(1/p(x)). This shows that,
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on any given occasion, the production of a low probability message provides a
large amount of information. However, since low probability messages occur in-
frequently, they contribute less to the average entropy of an information source
than do higher probability messages. To compute the average entropy of an in-
formational source, we therefore weight the entropies of individual messages by
their probabilities. Summing over those weighted entropies yields the average
entropy of an informational source.
H(X) =
∑
p(x)log2(1/p(x)) (1)
One consequence of this expression is that the more variation there is in
a set of signals, the more entropy there is in the source from which they are
derived. Imagine I regularly report to you the results of the football games
that occur at my home stadium. Then, we can think of my home stadium as
an information source. There is probability distribution over the possible game
outcomes. There is a distinct distribution over the possible things I might say
about those outcomes. The term “messages” refers to the outcomes themselves.
The term “signals” refers to the things I say in order to relay the messages.
Message and signal entropies are properties of individual components within
a communication system. In order for the communication system to function
well, the signals and the messages must be systematically related. The measure
of that relationship is called the mutual information. If my reports to you on
the football games deserve to be called informative, there must be a correla-
tion between the reports and the outcomes themselves. From a mathematical
perspective, mutual information is similar to statistical measures of correlation
between random variables, except that it scales with the entropy (variability) in
the source variable. If we assume that my reports about the football games are
always accurate, so that the correlation between signals and messages is 1, the
amount of mutual information in the system is equivalent to the initial entropy
(variability) in the distribution of game outcomes. So, if our arrangement is
that I report to you the final score of each game, the amount of mutual in-
formation expressed by our communication system will be substantially higher
than it would have been, had we arranged for me to report only the name of
the winning team.
We can think about the entropy of the distribution of game outcomes as
equivalent to your average degree of uncertainty about game outcomes. Call
that variable H(X). To compute the mutual information, we subtract the in-
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formation that you could in principle acquire about the value of X, given knowl-
edge of the value of Y . This term can be expressed as H(X|Y ). The mutual
information, therefore, can be written as:
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (2)
Mutual information is measured in bits. But since the mutual information
between two variables can change over time, the quantity of interest in theo-
retical neuroscience is more often the bit rate; that is the number of bits one
variable carries about another per time unit.
Most of the experimental data on bit rates for individual neurons comes from
experiments on perceptual neurons. The organism is fixed in place, presented
with a particular class of stimuli, and recordings are made from the neuron of
interest.
Neural information in response to dynamic stimuli
Animal System Bits/s Coding Efficiency
Frog auditory 133 90%
Cricket sensory afferent 294 50%
Electric fish p-afferent 200 50%
Table 1: Adapted from Borst and Theunissen (1999). Standard claims about
the capacity of perceptual neurons in various organisms to transmit information.
The estimates in Table 1, which are taken from a classic review paper, con-
stitute canonical examples. The quantities in the first column represent the bits
per second transmitted by a perceptual neuron under natural stimulus condi-
tions. Those in the second represent the average coding efficiency of the spike
train of that same neuron. The coding efficiency is the ratio of the rate in the
first column to the default entropy of the neuron’s spiking behavior - that is,
its behavior in the absence of a characteristic stimulus. The ratio is so called
because it describes how much of the variance in a neuron’s spike train is ex-
ploited to carry information about changes in a time-dependent stimulus. As
the ratio approaches one, the neuron is said to approach the physical limits on
the transmission of information (Rieke et al., 1993; Koch et al., 2004).
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4 The Ontological View
So far, I’ve described very briefly how information theoretic ideas are used in
neuroscience. Now I want to shift focus to a related question: what exactly
does it mean to say that a neuron transmits Shannon information? What is
the empirical content of this claim? Answering these questions will help us to
evaluate the justification for the bifurcation view of brain information discussed
at the outset.
According to one prominent tradition, to say that a physical thing carries or
expresses Shannon information simply means that there is an empirical correla-
tion between it and some other physical thing. The empirical correlation view
is expressed, for example, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on
information in biology. There, Kim and Godfrey-Smith say that information is
present wherever there is contingency and correlation.
For Shannon, anything is a source of information if it has a number
of alternative states that might be realized on a particular occasion.
And any other variable carries information about the source if its
state is correlated with the state of the source (Godfrey-Smith and
Sterelny, 2008).
What is the motivation for this extremely permissive view of information?
Philosophers interested in the mind and brain who have discussed Shannon in-
formation have usually done so in the context of either endorsing or denying a
proposal to provide a reductive explanation of semantic phenomena in terms of
raw empirical probabilities. This is a long-standing project undertaken first by
Fred Dretske (whose ultimate goal was a naturalistic account of knowledge), and
continued today by Brian Skyrms and his followers. In order for that kind of
reductive project to make sense, the notion of Shannon information cannot pre-
suppose the existence of semantic properties. Philosophers interested in making
progress on this reductive project therefore have a reason to conceptualize Shan-
non information in such a way as to ensure that ascribing it to a physical system
is both risk-free and thoroughly uncontroversial. Given this understanding of
the concept, Shannon information will be instantiated in the relation between a
stimulus and a perceptual neuron, but it will also be instantiated in the relation
between any two arbitrarily chosen neurons, provided that those neurons are
not perfectly stochastically independent.
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This permissive ontological view is not adequate for interpreting the scientific
content of the claim that a neuron carries or transmits Shannon information.
Common causes and spurious correlations are everywhere. Covariation among
empirical variables is therefore cheap. Without some independently motivated
theoretical framework, bare correlation is no aid to understanding how a system
works. This is especially true in a complex networked system like the brain. In
such a system, correlation is practically ubiquitous. So, if Shannon information
is just a fancy term for empirical correlation, as the ontological view suggests,
Shannon information is ubiquitous. If Shannon information is ubiquitous, hav-
ing particularly high rates of Shannon information flowing through a system
cannot be viewed as a functional capacity of the system.
As Table 1 illustrates, however, information rates do describe performance
capacities. To reinforce this idea, consider the design of experiments used to
evoke the appropriate data. Above, I said that the coding efficiency of a neuron
is the ratio of its active firing rate, in the presence of a stimulus, to an infor-
mation theoretic measure of the default variability in the neuron’s behavior.
Designing an experiment that evokes the relevant data requires that we under-
stand both the neuron’s default behavior when it is not engaged in a task, as
well as its behavior when it is optimally active, helping to process the kind of
stimulus to which it is best attuned. So, if we are to correctly estimate the in-
formation rate of a perceptual neuron, our choice of stimulus matters crucially.
In a discussion of information theory as applied to vision in particular, Dayan
and Abbott say:
The basic assumption is that these receptive fields serve to maxi-
mize the amount of information that the associated neural responses
convey about natural scenes in the presence of noise. Information
theoretic analyses are sensitive to the statistical properties of the
stimuli being represented, so the statistics of natural scenes play an
important role in these studies (Dayan and Abbott, 2001, p. 135).
So, if we want an accurate estimate of the neuron’s information rate, we need
to design an experiment in which the kind of stimulus we employ corresponds to
the biological function of the neuron from which we record. The relevant notion
of function here is the kind that is applicable in evolutionary explanations of
biological traits, sometimes known as etiological functions. A trait has a function
in this sense if it has played the right sort of fitness-enhancing causal role in the
organism’s ancestral lineage.
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This idea is bound to provoke skepticism. If neural information rates can
only be estimated accurately if the researchers know what role the neural signal
played in the evolutionary history of the organism, then we might as well pack
it in and go study something more tractable. The situation is more hopeful
than it looks, however. As is the case elsewhere in biology, functional ascrip-
tions are not typically made on the basis of detailed knowledge of the historical
record. Instead, they are grounded in adaptationist reasoning (Dennett, 1996).
In perceptual neuroscience, adaptationist reasoning yields a simple principle:
the stimulus that best reflects the etiological function of the neuron is the one
that maximizes the mutual information between stimulus and spike train. This
optimality assumption allows neuroscientists not only to fine tune their under-
standing of neural function, but in some cases, it allows them to discover func-
tionally appropriate stimuli in the first place. For example, one can generate
artificial stimuli with a range of statistical parameters, and then use principal
components analysis or other bottom up search techniques to identify which
parameter settings lead to maximal informational performance (Sharpee et al.,
2004).
The lesson here is that estimates of neural information transmission are
about the performance capacity of the neuron; and to measure the performance
capacity of a neuron, you have to create the right experimental conditions.
Creating those conditions forces you to draw on an understanding of the what
task the neuron is trying to perform. Because the ontological view is blind to
the function of a neuron, it is not the conception of information we need to
interpret the scientific content of neural information rates.
5 The Reification View
Because estimates of neural information rates are highly sensitive to experimen-
tal design and choice of stimulus, its scientific proponents are often anxious to
demonstrate that their methods are objective, and empirically sound. They
want to show that the amount of information flowing through a neural circuit
is not just a matter of the scientist’s perspective on the situation. However, the
desire to show that informational quantities are genuinely empirical sometimes
leads to an awkward sort of reification. In the context of a paper on information-
theoretic approaches to retinal physiology, Meister and Berry, well-established
practitioners in the field, make the following remark.
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It has long been recognized that the essential substance transmitted
by neurons is not electric charge or neuro-chemicals, but information.
In analyzing a neural system, it is essential to measure and track the
flow of this substance, just as in studies of the vascular system one
might want to measure blood flow (Meister and Berry, 1999).
This remark is such an obvious exaggeration that one is forced to wonder
whether the authors really meant it. Nevertheless, the claim warrants closer
attention. Although it may be obvious that it is misleading, it is not entirely
obvious what makes it so. In my view, the analogy between information and
blood is flawed primarily because it suggests that information is material stuff,
which it is not. Blood can be removed from the body and nevertheless continue
to deserve its status as blood. (Blood banks would be pointless if this were not
so.) Action potentials are not like this. They play the role of an informational
signal when they are embedded in an organism that moves about in the world.
In vivo, an action potential is just a burst of electrochemical activity. There’s
nothing particularly informational about it.
This is not merely an intuitive judgment. The quantity of information car-
ried by a signal depends essentially on that signal being incorporated into a
functional system capable of reading it, as well as on the manner in which it is
read. To see this, consider an example from communications technology. Last
year, the National Security Agency in the United States discovered that terror-
ists were communicating with one another via codes embedded in JPEG files.
A picture of a puppy would be sent to the attacker, but deep in the bit file was
pattern that could be decoded into natural language. How much information
did the file contain? From the perspective of the modem used to download the
file, it might have been exactly 2Mb. But from the perspective of the would-be
terrorist, it could have been just 1 bit. It might, for example, have resolved the
uncertainty between just two options: “attack” and “wait.”
The lesson implicit in this example is that the quantity of Shannon infor-
mation attached to a signal is not determined entirely by its intrinsic material
properties. It depends also on the capacity of a receiver to recognize the signal,
and the manner in which it is recognized. This makes informational quanti-
ties, unlike quantities of material substances, inherently functional. Blood has
a function of course, but, unlike information, its quantity does not depend on
whether it is measured in a functional context.
How do neuroscientists take this receiver relativity into account when esti-
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mating neural information rates? Once again, an adaptationist perspective is
called for. Adaptationism gives us reason to think that a spike train which is
finely calibrated to a perceptual stimulus is not just a wasted burst of energy.
We assume, and in some cases have neuroanatomical evidence to believe, that
downstream receiver mechanisms are standing by; ready, at least on some oc-
cassions, to make use of the signal in the service of the organism’s behavioral
goals.
6 A Functional Analysis of Shannon Informa-
tion
We’ve seen that the claim that a neural spike train transmits Shannon infor-
mation cannot be interpreted as the rather bland claim that the time course of
the spike train just happens to be correlated with some other empirical prop-
erty. Nor can it be interpreted as the rather mysterious claim that spike trains
constitute a special sort of material substance that is the hidden target of neu-
roscientific investigation. So how should we interpret it? What positive account
can we provide, given the discussion thus far?
One lesson that emerged form the discussion of the ontological and reifica-
tion views of Shannon information was that neural information rate claims rely
on adaptationist reasoning. Consequently, their scientific content includes an
ineliminable functional commitment: they came to be the way they are for a
reason. Another problem with the two analyses discussed above was that they
lacked any clear conceptual relationship to the definitions introduced in Section
3. My positive analysis is designed to remedy these shortcomings. On my view,
the claim that a neuron transmits Shannon information should be interpreted
to mean (i) that the neuron functions as a component in a semantic system, (ii)
that the functional capacities of the semantic system depend on the degree to
which it can exploit variations in the physical states of its component parts, and
(iii) the efficiency of that exploitation can, at least in principle, be measured.
This analysis shows how the relatively abstract idea behind information the-
ory - entropy - can have functional significance in a biological system. Recall
from Section 3 that the entropy of an informational source is proportional to
the number of physical states it can realize. From an adaptationist perspective,
the constant variation in the output signal of neurons must contribute to the
brain’s ability to process semantic information about what is going on in the
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environment and what to do about it. The more entropy the average neuron
can express, therefore, the more semantic processing the brain can achieve with
its relatively fixed stock of physical resources.
From this perspective, the Shannon properties of individual neural spike
trains can help explain how a brain manages to process so much semantic infor-
mation. It also helps us to think more clearly about the relationship between
information and evolution. If neurons only carry Shannon information, and if
Shannon information has nothing at all to do with semantic information, one
might reasonably wonder why neurons would have evolved such impressive rates
of coding efficiency. As Peter Godfrey-Smith has pointed out, there is no reason
for an informational system to evolve unless the information it carries is worth
getting across.
It is true that much of information theory can proceed without pay-
ing attention to the specific messages being sent over an information
channel, but there is no point in maintaining and using the channel
unless the messages sent do bear on something in the world, and can
guide actions or inferences of some kind (Godfrey-Smith, 2011).
Although this passage is drawn from a discussion that is not particularly con-
cerned with neuroscience, Godfrey-Smith’s subtle formulation is exactly right
for our purposes. We can say with considerable confidence that spike trains
“bear on something in the world” and also that they “guide actions or infer-
ences,” without committing ourselves to the view that there is some particular
chunk of semantic content that a spike train has been selected to convey. The
informational properties of individual neurons were selected, rather, in order to
increase the efficency of the semantic processing that becomes visible only at a
higher level of neural organization.
If this interpretation is correct, the bifurcation view discussed in the in-
troduction cannot be quite right. The bifurcation view says that semantic
properties are irrelevant to understanding the spiking behavior of single neu-
rons. But according to the functional analysis just suggested, claims about the
rate of Shannon information only make sense in a context in which semantic
information is being transmitted. This claim is not meant to suggest that all
applications of information theory will involve semantic systems. Information
theory is a branch of applied mathematics, and has a staggering range of inter-
esting applications. For example, it is used to determine how hugely complex
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genomic data sets can be represented most efficiently, in order to simplify com-
putation (Vinga, 2013). Set cases like this one aside. The claim I am making is
that if an informational rate is intended as a description of a functional capacity
within a system that uses information, then semantic properties must also be
involved.
7 On the Conceptual Fecundity of Shannon In-
formation
To this author, the suggestion that information in biological systems can be
measured is as inspiring as it is bold. The neuroscientists working in this area are
saying, at least by implication, that we can bring quantitative rigor to the study
of meaning and representation in animals. How could philosophers fail to take
interest in a claim like that? It is surprising, therefore, that the philosophical
literature includes precious little discussion of the topic.4 One reason for the
lack of interest in working out the philosophical implications of this area of
science may have to do with the fact that information theory has its roots
in computer science and communications technology, rather than biology. In
computer science, there is no significant danger that we will be mistaken about
what counts as an elementary symbol. There is no need to worry about whether
you have correctly understood the functional decomposition of the information
processor before thinking through coding strategies. What counts as a symbol
is underwritten by engineering conventions that we created, and to which are
baked into the way in which we learn to handle questions about information-
theoretic properties. If you consult a book on image compression algorithms, for
example, there will be plenty of discussion the properties Shannon introduced,
but little or nothing on the manner in which the image is stored in hardware.
One can restrict one’s attention to mathematical transformations of bit strings
since there is, at least quite often, no need to know anything about the physical
characteristics of the machine that will execute the algorithm.
This is very much unlike the world of biology, where basic questions about
how semantic signals are encoded remain open. If it turns out that, as some
neuroscientists believe, neurobiological information transmission occurs in large
part the dendritic level rather than at the level of spiking neurons (Ovsepian
and Dolly, 2011), then the mainstream understanding of functional decomposi-
4But see Rathkopf (2017) for a recent exception.
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tion of information processing in the brain will be wrong. If that is the case,
our current estimates of the rate of information transmission will also be wrong.
Moreover, the adaptationist principles that neuroscientists use to reason about
the functional decomposition of neural signaling systems are themselves open
to challenge and revision. For example, the optimality assumption suggested in
Section 3 stated that the stimulus that best reflects the etiological function of
a neuron is the one that maximizes the mutual information between stimulus
and spike train. Other principles are possible, however. For example, Levy
and Baxter (2002) suggest that the quantity nature actually tries to maximize
is the ratio of mutual information to metabolic cost. The lesson here is that
if we accept that semantic information and Shannon information are not en-
tirely independent from one another in the domain of biological signaling, the
study of information theoretic properties in the brain becomes both more error
prone, and also far more philosophically interesting than we might otherwise
have thought.
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